This course is an introduction to the fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design. It emphasizes on theoretical foundations, mathematical tools, modeling, and equilibrium notions in different environments.
LEC # | TOPICS | LECTURE NOTES |
---|---|---|
1 | Introduction | (PDF) |
2 | Strategic form games | (PDF) |
3 | Strategic form games: solution concepts | (PDF) |
4 | Strategic form games: solution concepts Correlated rationalizability |
(PDF) (PDF) |
5 | Existence of a Nash equilibrium | (PDF) |
6 | Continuous and discontinuous games | (PDF) (PDF) |
7 | Supermodular games | (PDF) |
8 | Supermodular and potential games | (PDF) |
9 | Computation of Nash equilibrium in finite games | (PDF) |
10 | Evolution and learning in games | (PDF) |
11 | Learning in games | (PDF) |
12 | Extensive form games I | (PDF) |
13 | Extensive form games II | (PDF) |
14 | Nash bargaining solution | (PDF) |
15 | Repeated games I | (PDF) |
16 | Repeated games II | (PDF) |
17 | Games with incomplete information: Bayesian Nash equilibria | (PDF) |
18 | Games with incomplete information: Bayesian Nash equilibria and perfect Bayesian equilibria | (PDF) |
19 | Mechanism design I | (PDF) |
20 | Mechanism design II | (PDF) |
21 | Social choice and voting theory | (PDF) |
Prof. Asu Ozdaglar, 6.254, Game Theory with Engineering Applications.
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology: MIT OpenCouseWare), http://ocw.mit.edu (Accessed August 27, 2013).
License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA
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